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ABSTRACT
This Thesis describes many of the important factors influencing
the process of Japanese defense policy formulation. The questions
posed include 1) What will Japan's Role be in the emerging
international security structure? 2) What internal factors
affecting defense policy need to be better understood by U.S.
policy makers? 3) What are some implications of the decision-making
process and political situation in Japan for the U.S.? The national
debate in Japan about defense is analyzed with a description of the
major advocacy groups, as well as the influence of the press and
public opinion. Political, historical, and social forces are
examined, as well as the Japanese defense policy-making process.
The thesis also examines the Japanese response to the Persian Gulf
Crisis of 1990-91, to gain a current perspective on Japanese
attitude toward defense and security issues. Conclusions are drawn
to answer the initial questions and to propose what the U.S. may
expect from Japan in the Area of defense matters in the future.
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One of the most pressing and challenging problems facing
defense programmers today is that of understanding the complex
relationship between Japan and the United States in matters of
defense burdensharing. These problems no longer concern just
the defense of Japan and the security of the western Pacific,
they are now problems of global proportions as both countries
move toward new roles in the international economic and
security community. The United States, while still the premier
world military and economic superpower, has lost relative
economic advantage and influence in many portions of the
world. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the western
Pacific. Japan has emerged from the war recovery years as a
vibrant and powerful economic force creating the backbone of
the western Pacific sphere of economic influence.
The U.S. is in a period of transition as the post-Cold War
world begins to take shape. The decrease in relative U.S.
economic leverage and strength is necessitating a reassessment
of the U.S. role in committing defense resources throughout
the world for the protection of world security and economic
interests. Some observers question whether the security
arrangements created out of the ashes of the second world war
are still appropriate and equitable in the present world
situation
.
The "Japanese miracle" of unprecedented economic growth
and development has produced an indisputable economic
superpower. Japan's economic influence is felt throughout the
globe as a supplier in essentially every major market for
manufactured goods and as a major buyer of industrial raw
materials as well as agricultural and energy products. Japan
has penetrated many markets traditionally dominated by
American industry forcing the U.S. to struggle to recapture
the competitive edge in many basic industries . The pillars of
Japanese strength are import /export activities, allowing its
highly developed industrial base to add value to raw materials
bought abroad. Freedom of trade and access to widespread
international markets are thus vital to the continued
viability and growth of the Japanese economy.
Japan' s international influence and interests extend well
beyond import/export markets and trade. Japan is the world's
largest lender nation, holding fully one third of all
outstanding international loans while the U.S. holds less than
one fifth. [Ref. l:p. 2] Its international economic activities
are so extensive that nearly any conflict, anywhere in the
world could directly threaten Japanese investment and economic
interests
.
This puts Japan in a position very similar to that of the
U.S., which has found that intervention is often necessary in
regional disputes to ensure the stability of economic
interests. Japan's position does, however, differ in that it
lacks the military establishment, internal political will and
the international consent to be an influential participant in
external military matters. In the post war era Japan has
become a nation that is at once an economic power and a
military dependant of the U.S.
There are many reasons for this situation, not the least
of which is the influence that the U.S. has had in Japan in
concert with domestic affairs and politics.
Japan' s defense policy is the reflection of the overall
U. S . -Japanese relationship, in which the United States
figures as a superordinate power. However this condition
alone does not explain Japan's external conduct, which the
Japanese liken to medieval Venice, an unarmed merchant
state. Beginning with the U.S. occupation Japan's domestic
institutions have been altered and adapted to the nation'
s
external conditions with the support or acquiescence of
the Japanese themselves. Japan's external conduct results
from the interaction of America' s Japan policy and Japan'
own domestic politics. It was Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida who blended the two to produce today' s Japan with
all of its strengths and weaknesses. [Ref. l:p. 9]
The Japanese military establishment is the product of U.S.
pressure to establish a viable defense of the Japanese
homeland primarily from the threat of invasion by the Soviet
Union. Japan now possesses one of the world's largest
militaries in dollar terms. However, the effectiveness of
this force to carry out even its basic mission is continually
questioned. Even though the Japanese have invested heavily in
some of the world's best, most technically advanced military
equipment, many argue that they have failed to establish the
logistical or command and control structure required to
sustain any kind of meaningful, theater-wide anti-invasion
operation
.
In recent years questions have been raised by many in the
world community regarding the appropriateness of Japan'
s
commitment in both resources and principle to its own defense
and to world security and stability. Various bodies of opinion
suggest that the lessons of World War Two are well understood
and appreciated and that we are faced with a new Japan that is
ready to take its place in the world community of peace-
seeking nations and thus bear a reasonable and equitable
burden of maintaining the security of this community. This
issue has continued to become more emotional and has been
especially intensified by Japans' s reluctance to participate
in the recent Iraqi conflict.
While the world community, and especially the U.S., put
pressure on the Japanese to make greater contributions to its
own defense and world-wide defense efforts, it is important
for those outside of Japan to fully understand the forces at
work within Japan to shape the policies they see in practice.
Full consideration of the current Japanese situation reveals
that there exist significant barriers to increasing Japan's
commitment to defense.
The objective of this study is to identify and analyze the
internal factors within Japan which together act to influence
and shape the current Japanese policy on defense and security
matters. U.S. policy makers and defense planners will need
this information as they deal with the Japanese in
negotiations and in programming the U.S. resources that should
be committed to the defense of Japan and the western Pacific.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The western Pacific will continue to be an area of
significant strategic importance well into the next century.
The increasing economic influence and importance of the region
will make it a major factor in the world security picture. The
potential for conflict and instability in the region, while
apparently decreased as a result of world-wide Soviet threat
reduction, is still significant and will require continued
commitment of defense resources for well into the foreseeable
future. For this reason several important questions in three
key areas will need to be addressed as the U.S. seeks to
develop a long range security policy for the region.
1. Japan's Role
What will be Japan' s role in the security structure of
the western Pacific? What role does the U.S. want that role to
be? How does this role perceived by the U.S. differ from that
perceived by the Japanese Government or by the Japanese
people? What historical, political and geo-strategic forces




To what extent do constitutional, governmental or
procedural issues impede Japan's formulation of a more
participatory defense policy? What are the internal political
and social forces influencing defense policy? To what extent
are these trends likely to continue?
3. U.S. Implications
Finally, what are the implications of this process of
Japanese defense policy formulation for the U.S.? What should
defense planners and decision makers appreciate about this
process and how should it affect decision making in the U.S?
The United States and Japan are world powers and world
partners whose political, economic, social and cultural ties
continue to multiply and strengthen. There is little doubt
that U . S . -Japanese cooperation is vital to the economic well-
being of the entire world. The issue of defense burdensharing,
which in the past has been, to some extent, an area of
frustration in U.S-Japanese relations, will be resolved only
when these superpowers fully understand and appreciate their
respective positions and the difficulties involved in altering
those positions. While this study will not eliminate the
communication or understanding gap, it may be able to shed
some light on some of the areas that could help lead to an
atmosphere of increased understanding as these two nations
seek to establish a security relationship that is both
mutually beneficial and equitable.
II. FORCES AT WORK IN JAPANESE SOCIETY
A. THE PEACE CONSTITUTION
Since World War Two, the most powerful and enduring factor
influencing Japanese attitude toward defense and security
issues has been, without question, Article Nine of the "Peace
Constitution." The Constitution was drafted by General
MacArther and offered to the Japanese officials with the
assurance that their acceptance of it would allow the
continuation of the imperial monarchy as long as true
sovereignty was transferred to the people through the creation
of a parliamentary type government headed by a Prime Minister.
Article IX reads as follows.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as a means for settling international
disputes
.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other war
potential will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
1 . Occupation
During the first years of the U.S. occupation of
Japan, General MacArther set in motion the major forces which
would dominate Japanese policy for at least the next forty
years. First was the creation and ratification of the new
Japanese constitution. Second were the sweeping reforms
initiated to affect the "purge of existing political forces
on the one hand and the unleashing of the left wing on the
other." Also, with MacArther' s blessing the Japanese Socialist
party was founded and the communists were liberated from jail.
[Ref. 1: p. 11] MacArther hoped that the seeds of revolution
would be sown and that the results would be a democratic,
coalition government favorable toward the United States
.
However, in 1947-48 the U.S. made a radical reversal in
Japanese policy. Now Japan was seen as an important potential
ally in the containment strategy evolving with the advent of
the Cold War. The reforms initiated by MacArther were
substituted for a policy to try to shape Japan into the
political, diplomatic and, to a certain extent, the military
power that would meet the needs of the new strategy. This new
direction eventually led to the creation of the U . S . -Japan
Security Alliance which has provided the foundation for U.S.-
Japanese defense relations ever since.
2 . Interpretation
Most of the tension and frustration in Japanese
domestic and foreign policy since World War Two have been as
a result of the paradox created by the switch in U.S. policy
during the occupation. Immediately following the war, amid the
wreckage of a country ravaged and conquered at an incredibly
high cost, the U.S. was anxious to ensure that the Japanese
militarism would never menace the world again. In effect, the
U.S. stripped the Japanese nation of the legal right to exist
as an independent entity able to defend itself and control its
destiny. The Japanese, beaten and desperate to cling, at least
in part, to their imperial past, reluctantly accepted the
constitution to prevent its demise.
When the realities of the Cold War bore down on the
U.S. it became apparent that, while it sounded good in 1945,
the U.S. written constitution did not fit the needs of a bona
fide nation in the international community. However, by this
time the constitution had a large constituency led by the
Socialist party. Although the U.S. along with conservatives of
the LDP sought to revise the constitution they have been and
continue to be unsuccessful. [Ref. 1: p. 11-12]
The outbreak of the Korean War gave the U.S. and the
revisionists the first chance to broaden the interpretation of
the constitution to include the legal right of Japan to raise
forces for the sole purpose of defending the Japanese homeland
from attack. It was then that General MacArther, in spite of
his aggressive and continual defense of the peace constitution
which he had drafted, ordered the creation of the first units
of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) . Within the
atmosphere of the ever heightening tensions of the Cold War
the U.S. saw in Japan an important potential ant i-communist
ally. Thus, through the years, with continual pressure, the
U.S. has been able to influence Japan, to create, bit by bit,
the world's third largest military force in dollar terms, in
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spite of a continual anti-military consensus in the
population.
3 . The Constitution Today
The question remains; What does article IX really mean
and what are its true implications today? To the majority of
the Japanese people it is a constant reminder of the carnage
of World War Two and a promise that Japan would never be found
in a similar position. To others it is a stumbling block
slowing the progression of Japan in the international
community and to many Americans and others outside Japan it is
a facade behind which Japan can hide, shirking legitimate
responsibility
.
Through the years the revisionist movement has lost
most of its momentum. The Constitution is a part of the
Japanese life and mind-set that provides, to a certain extent
a stabilizing force in Japanese politics.
.... revisionists, no matter how irate at having to live
with the "MacArther constitution, " recognize that the
balance of political power makes the amending of the
constitution a political impossibility. The Socialist
party, for its part, finds it increasingly difficult to
rally support in the name of the "peace constitution"
which the Japanese public, if not its political
leadership, now takes largely for granted.
The basic law, drafted nearly thirty (now forty six)
years ago under the guidance of American Occupation
authorities, is now so widely accepted by the public as
setting the legitimate and appropriate framework for
conduction the nation's affairs that it is not possible
for politicians to rally support on either side of the
revisionist issue. [Ref. 2: p. 56,57]
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It is easy to mistake the increased competition and,"
in some cases, confusion in Japanese politics for instability.
However, there exists an inherent stability in the system due
partly to a high level of social and ethnic unity in Japan,
partly to the doubts that major changes would improve Japan's
security or economic position and partly by the almost
universally held view that the constitution is compatible with
Japanese traditions and interests
.
[Ref. 2: p. 57]
Japanese culture and history is characterized by
centuries of feudal conflicts . Much of the conflict was very
subtle, at a constant and low level of intensity meant to wear
down the opponent while slowly broadening ones' s own interests
and influence. This conflict exists today as well. No longer
are the warring parties rival clans or lords. They are now
government ministries and parties and factions within the
parties. [Ref. 13: p. 24]
B. THE NATIONAL DEBATE
Through the nineteen fifties and sixties the Japanese
government adopted the policy of totally basing its security
on the U.S. -Japan security treaty, building only a very small
self-defense force. After 1975, there began to grow in Japan
a perception of a change in the balance of superpower military
capability. As a result, widely differing views on Japan's
best course for the future began to emerge. The main
participants in the debate were government officials, military
12
experts, strategists, policy analysts, and journalists. The
debate defined four main arguments and six main advocacy
groups; the realists, the diplomats, the progressive
conservatives, the nuclear advocates, the mercantilists and
the strategists. [Ref. 1: p. 25]
1 . Major Advocacy Groups and Their Views
a. The Realists
In the view of the realists, the balance of
military power has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union and
that since Japan is so closely allied and dependent on the
U.S. for its security this makes Japan less secure. Thus,
Japan has had no choice but to improve its own defense systems
to make them a credible deterrent in their own right . One
great concern expressed by this group was that in the event of
a major U.S. -Soviet confrontation, the Soviets would seek to
neutralize Japan much as it would Norway and Sweden in an
effort to create a perimeter of defense.
Many military analysts, Japanese and foreign, began
expressing the view that the SDF presented little credible
defense capability. In 1978, Osamu Kaihara, chief secretariat
of the National Defense Council publicly stated that the SDF
"absolutely could not last even 24 hours" due to the
vulnerability of the fixed radar sites and air bases at
Chitose and Misawa. This dismal assessment of the SDF's
13
capabilities was shared by many military analysts who also
expressed the view that the Japanese public had not been
adequately educated as to the importance of maintaining an
adequate defense system.
Also the buildup of Soviet Military capability in
the western Pacific, specifically the stationing of a good
portion of the Soviet western fleet in Cam Ranh Bay along with
the increased demands being placed on the U.S. seventh fleet
by the situations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf led
to the commonly held belief that the U.S. could only act in a
sea-denial rather than a sea-control role in the western
Pacific
.
The realists solution was to modernize and expand
the SDF to assist the American forces in providing air and sea
surveillance up to a 1000NM perimeter around Japan including
the Straights of Malacca. This could only be achieved by
expanding the Maritime SDF to 60 escort ships and by obtaining
advanced Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes.
[Ref. 1: pp. 2 6,27]
b. The Diplomats
The diplomats are those former bureaucrats and
politicians not convinced that the security of Japan is in
peril. They express the opinion that Japan should concentrate
its efforts in gaining international acceptance through a
vigorous foreign aid program coupled with innovative,
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proactive diplomacy to promote peace and human rights around
the world. Indeed, they propose, if this type of strategy
could lead to a more peaceful, stable and prosperous world
there would be no possible threat to Japanese security and
thus, no need for increasing the size or strength of the
SDF. [Ref . 1 : p. 28]
This statement by Kiichi Miyazawa, an LDP party
leader in 1984 illustrates the diplomats' point of view/
the road which Japan, an economic superpower, has
been walking . . . should be the best model for disarmament .
No better model can be found, even if we search throughout
history. I firmly believe that a successful walk down this
road with confidence will contribute greatly to the
international current of disarmament. I think we should
advocate this whenever there is an opportunity, and the
resources for any excessive military buildup should at
least be directed to assisting the developing
countries .. .We should proceed in the direction of making
the maximum contribution in non-military fields and in
taking the initiative in cooperating through peaceful
activities by giving the utmost assistance to developing
countries, being more active in various UN activities,
taking the initiative in large development projects on an
international scale. [Ref. 25: p. 94]
c. The Progressive Conservatives
The Progressive Conservatives, led mainly by the
Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) have established the strategy
of maintaining the status-quo on defense matters and nurturing
the U . S . -Japanese defense alliance depending heavily on the
pacifist principles established and legitimized in Article IX.
The conservatives view emerged out of the disillusion of war
and the revulsion of Japanese nationalism that had led to the
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war. They fuel their view along with a deep distrust of
traditional state power. The basis of their stance is the
support of the post-war democratic order, the new constitution
and the role that it created for Japan in the new world order
which was to show to the rest of the world that "a modern,
industrialized nation could exist without arming itself."
[Ref. 5: p. 235-236]
The Japanese people, having been victimized by a
reactionary leadership that indoctrinated them in an
artificial nationalism, had shown the demented course of
the modern nation-state by its aggression in Asia. As
victims of the advent of atomic weapons, the Japanese
people could argue convincingly that wars were ever more
destructive, that the new age of international affairs was
accordingly at hand and the sovereign prerogative to go to
war must be renounced. No other nation embraced the
liberal hope of the future world order with the enthusiasm
of Japan, for no other nation's recent experiences seemed
to bear out so compellingly the cost of the old ways.
[Ref. 5: p. 236]
This position gained strong public support during
the early post-war years since it provided the Japanese some
feeling of expiation for the war debacle and also provided
justification for concentrating all national energies to
rebuilding the nation and the economy. However by the
seventies it was apparent that the new world order was not to
come to pass, that power politics played an ever more
important role in the life of Japan and its widespread
interests. Thus, those identifying most with the progressive
viewpoint have in recent years shifted to a more moderate,
somewhat conservative stance.
16
During the seventies the perception that the
balance of superpower military power was moving in favor of
the Soviets led the conservatives to fear that any attempt by
Japan to compensate for the relative decrease in U.S. strength
would cause the Soviets to accelerate their military buildup
in the western Pacific. Thus, preventing military spending
from exceeding the 1% o GNP cap became the cornerstone of
conservative strategy. [Ref. 1: p. 30-31]
d. The Nuclear Advocates
The nuclear advocates believe that Japan has
outgrown the mistakes of the period leading up to and during
World War Two and, therefore, propose that every effort should
be made to match Japan' s international economic influence with
political and military influence. They believe that Japan is
ready to act responsibly as a full participant in the world
community of nations in all respects, leaving behind the
stigma of dependency in military and security matters
.
The nuclear advocates believe that the decline of
U.S. domination places the Japanese homeland at peril and
nuclear weapons are seen as providing the cheapest and
quickest means for Japan to establish a credible retaliatory
threat in an effort to deter aggression against the Japanese
homeland. [Ref. 1: p. 32-33] One of the most energetic
proponents of this point of view has been Shimizu Ikutaro who
writes;
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On the one hand, Japan must encourage friendly relations
with America, the Soviet Union and all other countries,
but at the same time we must not forget for an instant
that Japan is alone. In the end we can only rely on Japan
and the Japanese If Japan acquired the military power
commensurate with its economic power countries that fully
appreciate the meaning of military power would not
overlook this. They would defer; they would act with
caution and in time they would show respect even
though they (the nuclear powers) do not use their weapons,
(they) are able to instill fear in those countries that do
not have them. A country like Japan that does not possess
nuclear weapons and is afraid of them will be easy game
for the nuclear powers . Putting political pressure on
Japan will be like twisting a baby's arm. [Ref. 5: p. 241]
The nuclear option is proposed in varying scenarios
ranging from the domestic production, control and deployment
to that of following the West German example of obtaining
nuclear warheads from the U.S. to be mounted on Japanese
delivery systems or possibly the stationing of U.S. nuclear
forces in Japan.
Shimuzu, as a "respected intellectual and
theoretician of postwar progressivism" sent shock waves
through Japan with his essay for its candor and obvious
apostasy from the long accepted status quo. His constant
confrontation with the "contradictions and incongruities that
trouble Japan's postwar order" illicite sharp emotional
criticism from many sectors of Japanese society, especially
from the progressives and to a lessor extent the realists.
[Ref. 5: p. 241] This new nationalist sentiment does exist,
however, and must be taken into account in any attempt to
understand the full spectrum of the defense debate.
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e. The Mercantilists
The mercantilists distinguish their view through a
practical analysis of Japan's natural resources, geopolitical
position and economic structure. This leads to the conclusion
that Japan's role is defined as a great trading nation,
wielding power and influence and basing its world-wide
prestige on the power of its trade and commerce, much like
Venice and the Netherlands of the past. [Ref. 5: p. 238] In
reality this picture of Japan resembles most closely the
actual path that Japan has followed since the War. In 1975
Masataka Kosaka, one of Japan' s most influential political
scientists in an article written for the Journal Chuo Koron in
November, 1975, described his view of his nation's national
purpose. Japan, in his view, should act the role as merchant
in the world community, a middleman taking advantage of
commercial relations and avoiding involvement in international
politics. He writes;
A trading nation does not go to war, neither does it make
supreme efforts to bring peace. It simply takes advantage
of international relations created by stronger nations.
This can also be said of our economic activities. In the
most basic sense, we do not create things. We live by
purchasing primary products and semifinished products and
processing them. That is to say that we live by utilizing
other people's production.
Kosaka points out that this role is not a popular
one in the international community. It causes problems
particularly with the U.S. because "Japan has enjoyed both the
advantages and disadvantages of being an ally and the benefits
19
of noninvolvement . " As international politics and economics
become more and more intertwined Kosaka foresees more problems
for Japan unless it is able to manage its "crisis of spirit."
By which he means to hold firm to "no clear principles, but
merely pursuing commercial advantage." He identifies the major
danger as the possibility that the Japanese people may lose
their self respect. [Ref. 5: p. 239]
Another strong argument was offered by Amaya
Naohiro, the former Vice Minister of the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) . Amaya draws from
Japanese history to create a metaphor to represent present—day
Japan in the world community. He likens the world to Tokugawa
Japan in which society was divided into four functional
classes; the samurai, peasants, artisans and the merchants.
The present day samurai are the U.S. and the USSR, the third
world the peasants and Japan the merchants. In the sixteenth
century the merchants acted shrewdly and adroitly, disciplined
to pursue their fortunes while being dominated by the samurai
and among the war and turmoil of the time.
By the end of the Tokugawa period, Amaya points out,
merchants were so powerful that Honda Toshiaki remarked,
"In appearance all of Japan belongs to the Samurai, but in
reality it is owned by the merchants." What is required is
to stay the course, to put aside the samurai's pride of
principle, and to cultivate the tradesman's information-
gathering and planning ability, his tact and art of
flattery. [Ref. 5: p. 239-240]
Amaya believes that Japan needs to accept the role
that the post war order has carved out for it, exercising the
20
discipline to not waver even in the face of criticism from
within and abroad. However he also acknowledges along with
Kosaka that as American power declines and Japanese interests
become more global it will become more important for Japan to
be more cooperative in ensuring the security interests of
industrial democracies since it is no longer so easy to
separate economics and politics. [Ref. 5: p. 240]
f. The Strategists
The strategists recognize that Japan' s most
imminent threat to national security is the Soviet Union. They
cite the geo-political and historical evidence along with
Russian national interest for the basis for their concern.
However, for the most part they do not favor a buildup of
Japanese military strength to counter the Soviet threat in
south-east Asia. Instead, they support the status quo with
efforts on the margins to increase Japanese influence in
diplomatic and economic circles
.
The strategists express the need to nurture the
existing U. S . -Japanese security alliance by increasing Japan's
combat support, antisubmarine and airborne surveillance roles.
This, however, must be achieved without offending or alarming
the Soviets which could lead to further Soviet expansionism in
the region, much like the experience of the seventies which
was felt to be caused largely by the increased U.S. presence
and Chinese military buildup. [Ref. 1: p. 33-34]
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Like the diplomats, the strategists also support
increasing Japanese aid to developing and third world
economies. They acknowledge Japan's status as an international
economic power and as such is in a unique and desirable
position, capable of making a significant contribution to
world peace and cooperation by working toward improving
economic conditions world-wide. It would be important for
Japan to make continued and energetic diplomatic efforts to
promote peace and stability which would increase its own
security by reducing potential threats and the probability of
foreign aggression against Japan or any of her international
interests
.
While not completely inclusive, these groups represent the
bulk of the official and public sentiments toward defense and
security. Their views, while varied tend to reduce to four
main arguments or positions on defense.
First, the SDF is generally accepted as a necessary evil
but neutralism and pacifism continue to be strong factors in
the opposition parties. This pacifism grew directly out of the
U.S. occupation of Japan. Even though it is deeply grounded in
a large part of the populace it will likely not survive long
if the U. S . -Japanese defense relationship deteriorates. [Ref.
1: p. 37]
The Second view places at its center the peace
constitution which established the precedent for the U.S. to
protect Japan allowing emphasis to be shifted toward domestic
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economic development. MacArthur, determined to see that Japan
was disarmed forever at all costs and Yoshida, willing to
allow MacArthur' s doctrine to take hold and grow in post-war
Japan set the stage for the "economy first" doctrine while
allowing the U.S. to bear the bulk of defense burden. This is
the view that has prevailed since the occupation and has been
perpetuated by Prime Minister Yoshida and the conservatives.
This argument has led to the establishment in 1976 of the one
percent cap on defense spending, contributing to and
cooperating with the U.S. in defense and diplomatic efforts,
always in a supporting and following role, not striking out as
a leader
.
The third view is that of the mercantilists who see Japan
as having carved out a niche in the world order as the unarmed
power, wielding influence via economics and seeking to have
Japan simply accept that role and pursue it with singularity
of purpose
.
The fourth view held primarily by the nuclear advocates
and some of the realists proposes that Japan take a more
significant role in all aspects of world affairs by developing
a powerful military and that it deal with the rest of the
world on a basis of equality and full cooperation on all
fronts. This view is the farthest from the status quo and from
the heart and mind of the majority of the Japanese people.
However, its advocates do exist and are part of the forces
being exerted on defense policy in Japan.
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C. THE PRESS AND ITS INFLUENCE
The Japanese press system, one of the world' s most
extensive, with over 125 nationwide newspapers with a combined
circulation of over 68 million copies has long exerted
considerable influence over the minds and policies of Japanese
government officials. It appears to have failed however, to
sway public opinion drastically in security issues in the
post-war period. Its position has instead lagged behind public
sentiment, slowly shifting from a unified advocacy group for
the far left, conciliatory to the PRC and the Soviet Union and
critical of the Japanese and U.S. governments to a more
divided, more moderate group, more representative of
mainstream Japanese public opinion.
The historically "dovish" position of the press can, to
some extent, be explained by its history. The first newspapers
in Japan were founded during the Meiji restoration of 1868.
From their beginning their role has been that of "government
critic" endeavoring to enlighten the people of Japan, showing
them how Japan should be modernized. Often, governments trying
to control the damage in public opinion created by the press
would use the security police in an attempt to stifle it.
However the press remained somewhat independent until the
nineteen thirties when the militarist government imposed
complete censorship.
The journalists' failure to fight the government's
control of the press in the pre-war Japan years left them
with a sense of guilt, they felt that if they had only
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fought harder, they might have been able to prevent Japan
from getting involved in an un-winnable war. This feeling
persists today. [Ref. 3: p. 46]
Thus, much of the zeal the press has for the pacifist ideal
stems from a desire not to make the same mistakes again by
allowing the government a free hand.
The hostility toward the Japanese government and
especially with the U . S . -Japanese security alliance was most
aggressive and critical during the nineteen fifties and
sixties when the major papers attacked the government for
dragging its heels in normalizing relations with the PRC and
in settling the Northern Islands territorial dispute with the
Soviet Union.
During this period the press reported on Chinese and
Soviet issues in conciliatory manner, down playing the
possible threat to Japanese security posed by both of these
neighboring giants. Fear of offending Chinese communist
authorities prevented the press from even printing a report of
the downfall of Lin Pao. In 1975 Asahi Shimbun refused to
report riots in Hangchow in which 200,000 workers battled
government troops for months in defiance of the government
.
Japanese press coverage of the Vietnam war also has been
criticized as being biased misrepresentative . the Japanese
press corps in Vietnam never referred to the anti-Saigon
troops as communists, using instead the term "liberation
troops . " They reported that the struggle in the south had been
"spontaneously originated only among the people of the south,
"
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and that only weapons and no troops had been sent from the
north when overwhelming evidence existed that troops as well
as material were being sent from the north to support the war.
[Ref. 1: pp. 42-43]
During the seventies the Japanese press rallied around the
one percent defense spending ceiling, continuing attacks on
the government's security and defense policies. In November,
1970, for example a Sankei Shimbun editorial stated the
following;
Taking all if these circumstances in consideration, we
cannot but feel that the SDF's are only trying to keep
pace with the armed forces of other countries without
studying a proper upper limit or re-examining their own
foundations. We think that an attitude of the Self Defense
Forces has caused misunderstanding both at home and
abroad.
A change in the attitude of the press began to become
evident in the late seventies as a result of four specific
developments; 1) the Soviet military buildup in the Northern
Territories. 2) the growth and strengthening of the Soviet
Western Fleet. 3) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 4)
the apparent decline in U.S. power, prestige and influence
following the Watergate Scandal and the withdrawal from
Vietnam. Asahi and Mainchl have remained left of center.
However, Yomuri, Sankei and Ninon Keizai acknowledged and
expressed concern over the Soviet military actions and
buildup. [Ref. 1: pp. 42-49]
The public has been less openly critical on the issue of
security matters. Public polls have shown that from the
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nineteen fifties through the early seventies most Japanese
favored the maintenance of a small military force along with
the preservation Article IX of the constitution. The approval
for the U.S. -Japan Security Alliance has varied dramatically
through the years from a high of 80% in the early fifties to
a low of 20% in 1960. Approval for the treaty slowly grew
through the sixties to about 33% in 1970. [Ref. 1: p. 45]
It is thus apparent that the press was unable to influence
the public to disapprove of the SDF' s through the years of
their most significant growth. Also, anti-American sentiment
espoused by the press did not translate directly into anti-
American public opinion. Even without majority support for the
U.S. -Japan Security Alliance Japanese public support for the
U.S. remained strong with only a slight 6 to 8% disapproval
rating.
Still, the Japanese media remains a powerful force in
Japanese society discouraging increased defense spending,
basing its position mostly upon the fear of resurgence of the
militarism which led to the disaster of World War Two.
It is fashionable to be antimilitarist in Japan today. .
.
The Japanese cannot really get serious about defense
because of the structure of their alliance, of which the
Americans are the mainstay. This structure rests on the
assumption that a rearmed Japan would be a menace to its
neighbors Japan's media retain the bogey of Japanese
militarism and put it to good use. To exhort the Japanese
to spend more on defense will be futile as long as America
stands in awe of that bogey. [Ref. 1: p. 52]
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III. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY MAKING
In November, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford made the first
visit ever of an American president, in office, to Japan.
During this visit he addressed the Japanese Emperor saying,
"Let us continue to seek understanding with each other and
among all peoples. Let us work together, to solve common
problems, recognizing the interdependence of the modern world
in which we all live." [Ref. 6: p. 91] Mutual understanding
was the theme of that presidential visit and it continues to
be of paramount importance in all aspects of U. S . -Japanese
relations including the area of defense policy making.
Through the years since this initial presidential visit
both countries have made efforts with varying degrees of
success to understand and appreciate the intricacies,
possibilities and limitations of each other's policy making
system. One such effort in the U. S. took place in 1982 when
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs convened a workshop
in Washington entitled "Government Decisionmaking in Japan:
Implications for the United States."
In this workshop, the participants (Members of the House
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for
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Scholars and the Congressional Research Service) acknowledged
that the relationship between the U.S. and Japan was one of
the most important in the world at the time. This thought has
also been expressed by other very influential individuals such
as the former Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, who defined
The U. S . -Japanese relationship as "America's most important
bilateral relationship, bar none." [Ref. 13: p. 259] It was
also acknowledged that international security conditions in
the world were changing and that these changes could exert a
major impact on this relationship. The emergence of Japan as
a dominant world economic power, a growing Soviet military
presence in the western Pacific, trade frictions between the
U.S. and Japan and declining U.S. power were just a few of the
issues facing the two nations. Also noted was the fact that
significant progress had been made in adjusting the U.S. Japan
relationship to conform to the needs of the times.
Unfortunately though, much of the progress had not come as a
result of quiet and congenial diplomatic interchange. It had
instead often been affected by "heavy-handed U.S. pressure"
leading to highly contentious negotiations between high level
government officials. The Americans for the most part felt
frustrated over the amount of pressure that had to be applied
and energy expended in order to achieve even minimal results
.
[Ref. 10: pp.VII-VIII] The main questions posed at the
workshop were;
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• "How do the Japanese reach decisions on foreign economic
and defense issues important to the United States?"
• "How can the United States more effectively influence
Japanese policy in directions favorable to U.S.
interests?"
There was general agreement at the workshop that Americans
needed to become more skillful and knowledgeable about the
Japanese system in order to become more effective in
negotiations with the Japanese and to prevent eroding the
solid foundation of trust that had been the basis of U.S.-
Japanese relations throughout the post-war years.
[Ref. 10: p. VII]
A. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM
1 . The Roots of Japanese Policy Making
a. "The Truncated Pyramid"
Prior to World War Two the Japanese political
system, was an Emperor state set up under the Meiji
constitution with the Emperor holding supreme and unified
power. In reality, however, the bulk of the real policy making
and implementation was done by the powerful ministries within
the bureaucratic structure of the government. The most
powerful of these ministries were the Ministry of the Interior
and the Ministry of War. Though he would occasionally express
his views on matters of state, rarely did the Emperor
intervene in the establishment or execution of foreign
policy. [Ref . 11: p. 120]
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The Prime Minister and his cabinet could exert
little influence over many matters, especially those
pertaining to military or foreign affairs due to a doctrine of
independence of the supreme command which placed those matters
outside the competence of the cabinet . This created a system
of government in which the top leaders actually held much less
control over important decisions than their positions would
indicate. This situation has been called a "Truncated
Pyramid." [Ref. 7: p. 118]
Postwar Japan saw the Emperor assume a purely
symbolic role with the Prime Minister recognized as the
legitimate head of the government. While the postwar prime
ministers enjoy more power than their prewar predecessors,
they still have been significantly more constrained in policy
setting than other democratic heads of state. Thus, to a
certain extent, the truncated pyramid persists in modern
Japan. [Ref. 7: p. 119]
The Japanese Prime Minister who comes to power as
a faction leader in the LDP must rely on continual support
from his own as well as other factions in the LDP and business
leaders for financial support . Unlike his American counterpart
who serves for a fixed term, his term could end at any time
when the consensus support in his party and business erodes
.
Thus, the Japanese prime Minister will often shy away from
making bold policy decisions for fear of losing constituency.
Every move is made only after an exhaustive effort to
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determine the consensus in the party, in business and in the
bureaucracy. [Ref. 7: p. 120]
Jb. Japanese Democracy
The LDP came to power in the Diet and the Prime
Minister's office in 1955 and has been in power ever since. In
1955 the party was, for the most part, led by old prewar
bureaucrats who came to power as a matter of convenience. The
postwar government's priority was to affect economic and
social reforms
.
The experienced bureaucrats were the most
qualified to lead the party and the government through the
period of reform. The opposition parties mounted an
ideological campaign in an effort to undermine support for the
conservative LDP. But, as the public's concern turned to
personal economic welfare, opposition party support has never
been sufficient to end the rule of the LDP. Since 1955 the LDP
has become a "conglomerate of mini-parties." The Prime
Minister is chosen out of a consensus of these mini-parties.
The intraparty conflicts associated with Prime Minister
selection have become increasingly bitter through the
years. [Ref. 11: p. 120] The goal of the American occupation
authorities following the war was, in effect, to democratize
Japan. Early in the occupation MacArther's General
Headquarters of the Allied Forces abolished many of the
powerful prewar ministries and established a system for
election of local government leaders. However, the advent of
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the cold war prevented that process from being completed by
extending it to the national level. Thus, many of the prewar
bureaucrats who had been barred from government were now
allowed to return to important policy-making positions in the
party and the ministries. Therefore, many of the aspects of
the Prewar bureaucratic rule pervaded the postwar government
as well. With time, the old bureaucrats were displaced in
party leadership by emerging local politicians who brought
with them into office an agenda to cater to the needs and
desires of their local constituency. The new leaders'
overriding concern for constituent "pork barrel" issues led to
an increased emphasis of local issues in the party and a
decrease in concern for national issues. [Ref. 11: p. 121]
2 . The System Today
a. Intraparty Politics
While the Japanese decision making systems bears
many resemblances to the systems in place prior to the war,
there are some significant differences which set it apart from
the old system. First, there is increased stature and power
vested in the office of Prime Minister. No longer a mere
puppet of the Ministry heads, the Prime Minister is recognized
as the legitimate head of the government . Second, is the
important role that the intraparty politics of the LDP play in
the policy-making process of Japan.
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Intraparty politics create an important influence
on the Prime Minister. To become Prime Minister one must first
be the leader of one of the LDP factions and then be selected
to head the government by gaining endorsement through
consensus of the party faction leaders. Factions exist more
because of "personal loyalty and political self interest" of
the members than for differing camps of policy views.
Therefore, they are of little direct significance in deciding
policy matters. The important role they play is to limit the
independence of the Prime Minister. In all issues the Prime
Minister must consult all faction leaders to prevent eroding
his coalition support in the party. This makes the Prime
Minister a "leader of a sort of collective leadership, " a
"first among equals," if such a thing exists. [Ref. 12: p. 36]
Many have criticized the factions on the grounds
that they weaken party unity, damaging the LDP's image with
voters. They have also been accused of breeding corruption and
financial dependence on big business . This point has been
underscored by the rash of political scandals uncovered in
Japan during the eighties. Even with the controversy that
surround them, factions do seem to play an important role by
providing some means of checks and balances, preventing the
emergence of monolithic government. This is especially
important in Japan where alternation of the party in power is
rare. [Ref. 15: p. 46-48]
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The American President certainly has concerns about
political repercussions of his actions, but they are not as
quick acting or as restrictive as those of concern to the
Japanese Prime Minister.
b. Bureaucratic Politics
The high level officials of large Japanese
government agencies and ministries appear to play a much more
significant role in policy making than their counterparts in
the U.S. Due to their positions and expertise in their
respective areas these bureaucrats are at a considerable
advantage over party leaders or cabinet members as a result of
their access to pertinent and important information. In fact,
elected government officials rely heavily on the bureaucracy
for information. As a result, in matters of foreign policy or
defense, the image of the world perceived by the government is
created by the bureaucracy.
American government leaders have at their disposal
separate and somewhat independent organizations from which
they can draw information. The President is aided by the
agencies which are part of the executive branch of the
government and as such work directly for the President, e.g.,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Council, and the Departments of Defense and State. The LDP
does have organizations meant to provide information to
decision makers such as the Foreign Affairs Research Committee
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and the Policy Affairs Research Council. However, in practice
these groups do little independent research. Their main role
has been to analyze the documents prepared by ministry
officials and to pass them on with little or no changes. [Ref.
7: p. 125]
c. Business Influence
As Japanese business has become more
internationalized its interests in foreign policy as well as
many other areas of government has become more intense. In
recent years this increased interest has translated into
involvement by business leaders in the decision-making
process. Often they exert influence indirectly through the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or by
contacts with party faction leaders. However, today they are
becoming more directly involved in policy process.
Japanese politics in the nineteen eighties can best
be characterized by the emergence of the private sector onto
the political scene. Japanese business derives much of its
new-found political clout from the extensive market
liberalization and relaxation of many governmental regulations
which had previously aggressively guarded by politicians. In
the early eighties the U.S. led the way in market
liberalization. Forces in the maturing Japanese economy sought
the same type of freedom for competitive growth. However, with
the subsequent increase in economic interdependency came a new
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desire to maintain national identity. National defense thus
became a growing symbol of national identity and as such,
received significant budgetary increases throughout the
decade, greatly as a result of the influence of the private
sector. [Ref. 19: p. 271-272]
One recent defense issue in which business leaders
were intimately involved was the debate surrounding the joint
U . S . -Japanese project to produce a combat aircraft, the FSX.
This debate placed the Japanese defense industry at the center
of the controversy and negotiations between the U.S. and
Japan. The industry lobbied aggressively for domestic
production of the aircraft on the basis of overall cost saving
and incorporation of technologies in which they claimed to be
ahead of the American companies. [Ref. 24: p. 465] This effort
by Japanese industry to intervene in sensitive defense related
negotiations set a precedent which is likely to continue.
The interaction and power sharing relationships of these
three groups have been explained in the literature in what has
been called "the elite model." As described by Haruhiro Fukui;
Businessmen and bureaucrats in turn both need and depend
on each other and the LDP. Businessmen collectively want
to see the capitalist free-enterprise system continued and
consequently work to keep the conservatives in power.
Individual businessmen and various business sectors are
also interested in having particular legislative bills
promoted or blocked in the Diet in accord with their best
interests. Bureaucrats, meanwhile, look to the LDP
politicians for actions favorable to them in budget
appropriations and jurisdictional aggrandizement.
Furthermore, many senior bureaucrats hope to enter
politics after early retirement, and the friendship of
influential politicians is important to them. Other
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retiring officials seek to find jobs in private firms and
for this reason they cultivate friendship of their clients
while still in office by manipulating their regulatory and
licensing authority. These three groups are thus seen to
compliment each other, forming a natural and happy
alliance. [Ref. 4: p. 24]
The tenets of democracy in Japan dictate that many
different voices are heard in government. As in every
democracy, a measure of efficiency in decision making is
forgone to allow for all interested parties to be heard and
for the political process to finally produce the policy most
representative of the will of the people and nation. In the
Japanese system the extremely broad power base inherent in the
political and governmental structure magnifies the burden
created by these democratic inefficiencies. The Far Eastern
Department of the British Foreign Office once made the
following observation about the prewar Japanese decision-
making system, likening the system to the Japanese custom of
carrying a light, portable wooden shrine called a Mikoshi;
The general direction is not in doubt, but the speed and
the manner of progressing is the resultant of thrusts from
one side and counter thrusts from the other side. The
shrine sways widely from one side of the road to the other
- backs and fills - sometimes it stays poised and
stationary, sometimes it lands the entire party in the
ditch. But the bearers all know where they are going and
sooner or later that is where they will take the shrine.
[Ref. 7: p. 122]
Although the military is no longer the preeminent
bureaucratic power that it was before the war, the Japanese
style of governing continues to bear a striking resemblance to
the Mikoshi style of prewar Japan.
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B. DEFENSE DECISION MAKING
The Japanese defense policy-making process, like the
process in the U.S., is extremely complex with many parties
involved and exerting influence. The process reflects the
general characteristics of Japanese policy making with its own
peculiarities and interested players . A more in-depth look at
the players and the process will provide a better opportunity
to understand its dynamics and limitations.
1 . The Process : Theory and Fact
The three major classifications of decisions which need to
be made in regard to defense and the mechanism by which they
should be made are;
* "Measures decided and put into effect by the Defense
Agency itself."
* "Important items (such as basic policies for defense,
outlines for national defense programs, advisability of
defense operation etc.) drafted by the Dense Agency and
decided on by the cabinet after consultations with the
National Defense Agency which are put into effect by the
Defense Agency."
* "Items on which opposition parties present opinions during
Diet deliberations, with decisions reached through
government ... replies to the opposition interpellation."
[Ref. 9: p. 56]
These decisions can have a significant effect on the
territory of almost all of the major ministries. Thus, the
process becomes very obscure as it tries to make defense
policy fit into the overall framework of the government,
catering as much as possible to the needs and wants of
competing interests. [Ref. 9: p. 57]
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In contrast with the U.S., very little of the decision-
making process in Japan can be seen by the outsider. It has
been estimated that at least 70 percent of the process is
invisible to the external observer. Much decision making in
Japan is influenced by a culture of bureaucracy with hundreds
of years of tradition, with formal rules never having been
written down or codified. The official process of government
contains little substance of the true process, so little, in
fact, that the Diet has been called "ceremonial" where
"Everything is decided before a bill is tabled." [Ref. 13: p.
151] Thus, a true understanding of the public and governmental
decision making system is difficult to obtain. And this is
certainly more the case for non-Japanese. Naohiro Amaya, a
former MITI vice minister has said;
We cannot objectively explain our decision-making system
to the outside world. Even Japanese don't understand it.
It's like the brain of a child that grows up as the child
grows
.
We may not be able to fully grasp all of the subtleties and
complexities that affect the defense decision-making system of
Japan, but a good start at obtaining some important and useful
insight would be to define the major participants in the
process and their relationships
.
2 . The Major Players
a . The Japan Defense Agency
Bureaucratic politics play a major part in all
aspects of Japanese government, but nowhere is this more true
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than in the area of defense policy making. This leaves the
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) at a distinct disadvantage since,
even though it is charged with the creation and execution of
defense policy, it is not the most powerful player in the
policy formulation process
.
Without question, the JDA has improved its stature
within the government in recent years. Created as a small
agency under the complete control of the National Police
Agency and the prewar Interior Ministry, it has grown to be a
well-established organization attracting many qualified
professionals who make a meaningful contribution to the
decision-making process. However, it still maintains its
agency status and thus is at a significant disadvantage while
bargaining with the major bureaucratic powers of large
ministries
.
Its position and status in the bureaucratic
structure thus presents the JDA with three obstacles as it
attempts to fulfill its role in the policy process.
"From the Japanese cultural tradition that places great
emphasis on consensus, it must seek to lead, but
carefully, within the limits of a system that prizes
conformity over charisma, uniformity over individuality,
and evolution over revolution. From its parliamentary
tradition it must seek to make policy advances in the
Cabinet and National Defense Forums where it is not a
major actor." [Ref. 9: p. 58-59]
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Jb. The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) , as the most powerful
ministry in postwar Japan, has widespread interests in all
aspects of government activities. All government agencies,
including the JDA, must negotiate their annual budgets with
the MOF. Therefore, a large portion of direct resource
allocation decisions are made within the MOF. The MOF' s stance
on defense has been one of preventing a departure from the
traditional approach of a balanced defense, which does not
necessarily depend heavily on "forces in being." By which is
meant physical weapons and force structure, instead
emphasizing intangible and indirect forces such as economic
and diplomatic power.
A basis for the MOF's continual influence over
defense matters is the existence of officials with prior
experience on the MOF in the JDA. This provides the MOF with
important links to the JDA and access to information on future
developing projects or priorities in the JDA which it uses to
weigh defense expenditures against all of the other competing
government interests. [Ref. 9: p. 60]
c. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) is the second most powerful ministry. Its main direct
concern and influence in regard to defense policy is in
weapons development decisions and thus it can have a major
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influence over shaping the very nature' of the JDA and the
weapons that it has at its disposal to carry out its mission.
Another central issue facing MITI, on which it has in the past
taken opposing sides, is that of cooperation in technology
sharing and domestic production of advanced systems.
Like the MOF, MITI has ben a leading advocate for
the development and employment of "soft power" to enlarge
japan's role in the international security structure. Thus,
MITI has pushed policies to increased economic and financial
interdependence, allowing market forces to shape the actual
relationships . The growing role of the Bank of Japan as the
monetary policy regulator for Pacific Asia is one example of
this policy in action. MITI has made Japanese industrial and
financial competitiveness the true measure of Japanese power,
diminishing the role of and, according to its policy
objectives, the need for military power. [Ref. 19: p. 270-
271]
d. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
In comparison to its relationship to the other more
powerful ministries, the relationship of the JDA with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has been more favorable for
the JDA. As early as 1978 the JDA recommended the abolition of
the security division of the American Affairs Bureau which
would place the full responsibility for security matters with
the JDA. This assault on policy territory once considered
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inviolate by other ministries was one indication that the JDA
was growing in confidence and support and was beginning the
transformation into a policy player in its own right.
The MOFA reacted by creating a security planning
committee in which it vested the responsibility of formulating
comprehensive security policy for the Foreign Ministry. Since
that time and primarily in the early eighties, the
relationship shifted from confrontational to a situation in
which they have found "themselves agreeing more often than
not." [Ref. 9: p. 62]
e. The National Defense Council
The National Defense Council is a body consisting
of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign
Minister, Finance Minister, JDA Director, and the Economic
Planning Agency Director General. Its function is to provide
a forum for negotiations between the various defense policy
stake holders. It has frequently been the venue of
bureaucratic "ambushes" of the JDA when it presented its
proposals for consideration. [Ref. 9: p. 63]
James Morley, a Columbia University professor has
noted, "The government of Japan is administered by
bureaucracies rather than bureaucracy, with each of the
separate bureaus being competitive with all the other
bureaus." The NDC is the embodiment of this observation.
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f . The Liberal Democratic Party
The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) of the
LDP has the primary responsibility for policy formulation and
initiation within the party. A number of committees and
subcommittees, commissions and divisions representing all the
departments of government operate within the council on the
broad policy issues relevant to their area of concern and
expertise, but rarely getting involved in the specific issues
associated with particular pieces of legislation. The most
important of these bodies are divisions and commissions which
are usually headed by senior party officials. [Ref. 12: p.
113] From the committees, commissions and divisions the policy
recommendations are passed upward to the Executive Council
where they are reviewed and debated before being passed along
further to the Cabinet for its endorsement before presentation
in the Diet
.
These divisions and commissions play several
important roles in the overall policy formulation process.
First, they provide a service to Diet members by educating
them about policy issues. Often, politicians have little or no
expertise in the area in which they are expected to make
policy. This also provides Diet members an opportunity to
establish an important network of ties with the bureaucrats
who are the real experts
.
Secondly, activity in the commissions and divisions
provides Diet members with tangible evidence of their
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involvement in the policy-making process for the benefit of
their constituents who want to be assured that their
representative is working for their interests.
Thirdly, the organizational structure of the
divisions and commissions provides a framework to provide
party members with powerful key positions. Since all
legislation must be approved by the divisions and it is
impossible to gain the consensus necessary for successful
passage in the Diet without support from the commission, the
leaders of these organs are major players in the policy
process. As such, they exercise what has been come to be
called zoku power. [Ref. 12: p. 114]
The literal translation of the term zoku is "tribe"
or "clan." The term is used to refer to a senior Diet member
who, by virtue of his experience, position or party and
government connections is recognized as being consistently
influential with the ministry responsible for the area of his
concern. The term "zoku giin" is used to refer to a member of
this elite group, with "giin" meaning "Diet member."
The key fact about the concept is that it deals with
policy making in Japan which, like many other aspects of
Japanese life, is divided between the formal and informal,
the tatemae (what is apparent or "up front") and the honne
(the reality behind the scenes) . The formality is what
occurs in the Diet to legitimize the law. The informality
is the role of the LDP's Policy affairs Research council
in considering proposed legislation before it goes to the
Diet . The even more informal is what the zoku giin do to
control the PARC, particularly when more than routine
change, or critical budget decisions, is involved. [Ref.
8: p. 164]
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The growth of zoku influence in LDP politics in
recent years points to an important development in the
decision-making process and the Japanese style government as
more and more LDP members seek to increase their influence by
narrowing their focus to a specific field of expertise. In the
past, individuals trying to have impact in dealing with broad
issues were often powerless as simply another voice in the
crowd. Specialization and organization have given party
leaders the legitimacy and credibility needed to make
themselves heard when the debate is about their specialty.
The defense-related groups that work in the
committees and subcommittees of the Policy Affairs Research
council are the National Defense Division, the Security
Affairs Research Council, and the Foreign Affairs Research
Council . These groups actively pursue contacts with the JDA on
many levels for the most current and relevant information
vital to ensuring that their viewpoint prevails in the
constant debate in defense policy formation.
One problem for the defense groups in the LDP,
including the JDA, is the difficulty these groups have in
attracting experienced and recognized party leaders into their
key leadership positions . Attracting such talent is one of the
most important ways that an organization within the party can
increase its power base. Since the positions in the JDA and
defense-related organs have been relatively lacking in
prestige and influence, these leadership positions
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historically have not been very sought-after by high-ranking
party officials. But, with the passage of time, and with the
growing reputation of the JDA, the prospects of an
increasingly influential leadership in important defense-
related positions in the party will increase as the JDA grows
its own crop of rising defense experts and more non-defense
bureaucrats find defense positions more attractive.
g. The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister is certainly a significant
contributor in the defence decision process, but, typically
much less so than an American President . Since defense matters
infringe on essentially all ministerial and factional policy
territories in one way or another, the Prime Minister's
limitations in flexibility and policy latitude are especially
severe. The barriers presented by the system were even enough
to stifle Prime Minister Nakasone, an avowed revisionist and
proponent of increased military spending. During his term he
did make some efforts, with some success, such as penetrating
the one percent of GNP ceiling for defense spending
established by Prime Minister Miki in 1976. But the resulting
defense budget of 1 . 004 percent of GNP can hardly be seen a
major reversal of traditional Japanese defense policy. His
caution also prevented him from raising the issue of
constitutional revision during his entire term. Instead he
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promoted a vague policy intended to "settle prewar accounts."
[Ref. 12: p. 36]
The Prime Minister's main power in defense policy
setting has been to influence it at the margins. Occasionally,
however, the Prime Minister has had a major impact on defense.
One such example occurred in the 1981 budget debate when the
JDA and the MOFA had both asked for a 9.7 percent increase in
the JDA budget. Prime Minister Suzuki closed the matter to
debate with the comment, "The way of thinking of the
administration officials concerned that a crack will appear in
U.S. relations unless a 9.7 percent is taken is mistaken."
[Ref. 9: p. 67] With this simple statement the Prime Minister
was able to slam the door on drastic increases for defense
spending. His position, which allowed him international
contacts with U.S. and other heads of state, gave him the
leverage he needed to dismiss the arguments presented by the
JDA and the MOFA.
Although these may be the most important actors in the
actual decision-making progress, many more players, including
business, the press, public policy think tanks and others have
direct or indirect influence on, if not the process itself,
the direction and eventual outcome of public policy process.
There is no single pattern of decision making in Japan. But,
a knowledge of the major players affords some insight useful
in establishing more meaningful relationships with Japan.
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IV. JAPANESE RESPONSE TO THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS
A . BACKGROUND
The crisis in the Persian Gulf of 1990-91 provided an
excellent insight into Japan's current attitude toward defense
and on the Japanese government's ability to create policy and
react to crisis. The background provided in the previous
chapters establishes a foundation for understanding what went
on during the debate in Japan over the formulation of a
Japanese response to the crisis.
The Gulf War appeared to shock the Japanese people and
their traditional view of their international position and
role . Uncertainty and debate about defense have been a
constant throughout Japan's post war period. However, recent
events have created a groundswell of unrest and reexamining of
basic arguments on all sides of the defense debate.
Until now, it has been regarded throughout modern Japanese
society as taboo and sure political suicide for Japanese
officials to consider or discuss Japanese involvement in
foreign conflicts such as the Gulf War. The crisis clearly
struck a nerve both in Japan and in the U.S. Apparent in Japan
was a public and a vocal disdain for American aggression and,
in the U.S., a feeling that Japan was seeking to avoid its
responsibility by refusing to send troops to join the
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coalition forces and by hedging on financial support for the
allied operations.
While the U.S. effort enjoyed widespread public support at
home, with 86 percent of Americans supporting the President's
decision to go to war, a survey conducted in Japan two weeks
after the start of the war indicated that 32.9% of the
Japanese interviewed supported President Bush' s decision while
47.3% opposed it outright. [Ref. 16: p. 2] Thus, there was a
strong anti-Bush, anti-American, anti-war viewpoint held by
many of the people of Japan.
In his opening speech at an extraordinary session of the
Diet in October 1990, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu described
the Persian Gulf crisis as;
. . .the severest trial that has faced our country since the
end of World War Two, a trial that urges us to decide how
Japan should contribute to the world as a peace-loving
state. . .Japan must not be a mere onlooker.
Many Japanese would tend to agree with him.
The realization that it is not enough to contribute to the
international community only in pecuniary and material
terms, that Japanese have to make a more personal
commitment - has become more or less a national consensus .
The question is: exactly how?.... with American soldiers
standing ready to defend international justice at the risk
of their lives, Japan found it difficult to refuse U.S.
demands for a contribution more visible than cold cash.
[Ref. 14: p. 11]
The debate is not about whether Japan ought to be an
international participant. The questions that remain concern
how Japan is to actually implement the objectives set out in
the preamble of the Constitution, "....to occupy an honored
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place in .... international society," while still upholding the
popularly supported pacifist ideals of the constitution.
The pacifist philosophy permeating Japanese public opinion
has created, in Japan, a status quo which has led the public
to shun military and security questions.
As laudable as this position is, it has nonetheless
given many Japanese an excuse to consciously avoid
thinking about war or military matters. And shutting out
war has led to an inability on the part of Japanese to
squarely face the stark reality that in the past, force
has been used to solve international disagreements and
today it can still effectively halt disputes.
I believe Japanese need to realize that the
renunciation of war does not eliminate the need to think
about security or armed forces. A viable pacifist policy
cannot exist without some knowledge of arms and
hostilities on the part of its proponents. Lacking a cool
assessment of reality, an anti-war policy becomes little
more than wishful thinking. [Ref. 17: p. 142]
In the Gulf, it was clear that significant Japanese
interests were at stake just as they were for the U.S. and
other industrialized nations. The Japanese government, in an
effort to bolster its shrinking international stature and U.S.
relations, finally committed 13 billion dollars to the
coalition forces. [Ref. 26: p. 44] Two billion dollars were
promised in August 1990 and another nine billion in January
1991 with another two billion for economic support of nations
affected and damaged by the war. [Ref. 18: p. 130] The
internal political struggle which ensued as the Japanese
government and the public grappled with the question of what
their nation's role should be in this type of conflict is
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instructive and reflects that the defense debate is far from
over .
Several proposals were considered by the Kaifu government
in response to the Gulf crisis. One proposal which was
presented to the Diet as new legislation was The United
Nations Peace Cooperation Bill (UNPCB) . The bill would have
allowed the deployment of SDF forces to trouble spots like the
Persian Gulf in support of U.N. sanctioned peace-keeping and
military actions. The bill created a stir of controversy in an
extraordinary Diet session convened October 12, 1990, facing
swift and major opposition from both of the major opposition
parties and even from within the ruling conservative LDP party
[Ref. 14: p. 6] By November 10 the bill still had not passed,
leaving Kaifu and his government searching for an alternative
means of quelling the growing international pressure, which
resulted in a cabinet order in January 1991, directing SDF
transport planes, ambulances and mine sweeping vessels to the
Gulf. The bill itself was somewhat contradictory in that it
stipulated that SDF forces would not face "armed threat or
employ force of arms while conducting operations with U.S. and
allied forces which were conducting all operations based on




1 . Major Forces at Work
The major forces at work to form the Japanese response to
the crisis were; 1) U.S. pressure for increased contributions,
including the dispatch of SDF forces to join the allied
forces, 2) The opposition parties supporting their traditional
stance of strict constitutional interpretation, and 3) Public
opinion strongly opposed to military involvement.
a. U.S. Pressure
In the earliest days of the crisis, immediately
following the August 2 invasion of Kuwait, the government of
Japan was one of the first in the international community to
take decisive action against Iraq by ceasing all imports from
and exports to Iraq, prohibiting all investments and economic
cooperation. However, from that point forward, all real action
from Japan came about as a reaction to pressure from abroad
(mainly from the U.S.) to increase its contribution.
Much of the pressure exerted was by direct
telephone calls from President Bush to Prime Minister Kaifu.
It was over the telephone that Bush initially asked for
financial contributions resulting in a one billion dollar
commitment on August 29, 1990, and then an additional three
billion on September 14. [Ref. 14: p. 10]
It was U.S pressure as well that prompted the
government to propose the UNPCB in October. Congress made its
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desires well known to the Japanese. Statements like that of
Congressman Riegle in which he said that what Americans wanted
to see was Japanese and German boys fighting in the trenches
right along side American boys [Ref. 20: p. 289] indicated to
the Japanese government that cash contributions would not be
enough this time to satisfy the international community and
above all the Americans
.
b. Party Politics
In recent years, there has been a slow but steady
movement in the major opposition parties, namely the Social
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the Komeito (clean
government) party, toward a more conciliatory stance on
defense, at least in their position regarding the legitimacy
and the existence of the SDF . Now they recognized the SDF's
existence in a type of de facto approval of their mission and
of the U.S. -Japan security treaty. [Ref. 19: p. 2 68] However,
the issue of whether to send SDF forces to aid the allied
effort once again raised old questions of constitutional
interpretation and the legality of Japanese involvement in
foreign conflicts.
The debate that ensued in the Diet over the UNPCB
turned out not to concentrate on what could be done to respond
to the crisis. Few questions were posed regarding the
significance of the crisis to the whole world and what the
appropriate Japanese response should be, or whether or not the
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UNPCB met the needs of the situation, or if Japan would be
able to follow through with such a response. Instead, the
overriding concern was what could not be done . The central
question of the entire debate was the constitutionality of the
UNPCB.
"In the Diet's eyes there existed neither the world nor
the Persian Gulf but only the sacred and inviolable
Article nine of the constitution, the protection of which
was set before each member as a test of theological
purity, paralyzing each in its magic spell." [Ref. 20: p.
278]
The stalemate in the debate was a result of first,
the staunch view of the opposition demanding traditional
interpretation and second, the failure of the Kaifu government
to call for a new interpretation of the Constitution. Fearing
a constitutional showdown, Kaifu tried to propose the UNPCB
within the context of the traditional constitutional
interpretation, which amounted to trying to fit a square peg
into a round hole. Had the government proposed the bill with
the understanding that its approval would mean a significant
change in Japan' s traditional position, it probably still
would not have passed. But, at least the debate would have
dealt with more substantive questions which would have
"aroused the Japanese to a sense of their international
mission and awareness of national security." [Ref. 20: p. 278]
Part of the reason for the Kaifu government's
failure to take a strong and decisive stand in the debate was
due to the fact that the LDP was severely divided on the issue
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of SDF deployment . Party Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa argued
that existing law allowed SDF personnel to be dispatched
overseas provided they were involved in a "peaceful purpose of
protecting Japanese citizens." [Ref. 21: p. 6] Others demanded
amendment of current law to specifically allow noncombatant
personnel to be deployed. Still others argued for no
restrictions at all on SDF deployments. [Ref. 21: p. 6]
The trend in recent years, as the LDP has become more
factional, has been for the Prime Minister to come from
smaller factions, representing a smaller fraction of party
power making the task of creating consensus in the party even
more difficult. In normal conditions, when dealing with much
less controversial issues it has taken a substantial amount of
time for the Prime Minister to create the consensus needed to
overcome the opposition. This task is even more difficult now
that the LDP no longer commands the majority in the House of
Councilors (upper house)
.
In this case, haste prompted the government to
bypass the normal procedures of deliberations in the divisions
and commissions of the Policy Research Council, which is an
important step in the creation of party consensus. It is at
this level where most of the important players in the defense
decision-making process (ie. the ministries, the JDA, business
leaders and others) make their most significant inputs. The
UNPCB was created, for the most part, behind closed doors in
private meetings between Kaifu and several "priministerial
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insiders . " The results were disastrous when the bill went
before the Diet. Without having subjected the bill to internal
party scrutiny and debate, the Government found itself
unprepared to answer questions during the debate without one
bureau chief contradicting the testimony of another or simply
not having the information necessary to satisfy the concerns
of the Diet members. This created the feeling that the LDP was
not unified behind the bill and thus, any chance of gaining
the partial opposition support necessary for passage was
destroyed. [Ref. 14: p. 10]
LDP party leadership did enjoy more success in
gaining needed opposition support for financial contributions
to the allied forces. The LDP gained the support of some of
the Komeito party by incorporating some of that party' s policy
preferences which included not raising taxes on tobacco and to
slightly reduce the defense budget to pay for the
contributions. Also, the LDP agreed to lend its backing to a
Komeito party member in the upcoming mayoral race in Tokyo.
This was disturbing to many of the rank and file members of
the Komeito party whose core supporters are members of the lay
Buddhist organization Soka Gakki that has maintained a
pacifist orientation in recent years. [Ref. 19: p. 259]
Here again, as is evident throughout Japanese
politics, the importance of consensus, or the lack there of,
was the determining factor in policy making. The decision-
making structure, adapted to the culture and attitude of the
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Japanese society, does not function well outside of its normal
procedures and precedents . Party and bureaucratic politics
rule and tradition remains as the hallmark of the system.
c. Public Opinion
Public opinion polls may not reflect the public's
precise attitude on a particular subject, especially over
time. Their unreliability generally results from poor or
nonspecific questions or the employment of nonrigid
statistical techniques. With that in mind, it is still notable
that all of the polls conducted in Japan during the crisis
strongly suggest that the pacifist tradition of the Japanese
people continues to thrive. However, there was evidence of
greater public recognition of the need for Japan to contribute
in some way to international security. It appears now that the
Government and the opposition parties failed to recognize and
act on this new dimension of the Japanese public's
understanding and desire.
A national telephone poll was conducted in October
by the Kyodo News Agency in which 1000 people were asked "what
do you think if the UNPCB?" Fifty percent of the respondents
indicated that they were opposed the UNPCB and about 13
percent were in favor of it . When asked, "What do you think of
dispatching Self-Defense Forces abroad?" about 67 percent were
opposed and again about 13 percent were in favor. However,
when these same 1000 people were asked, "In what form do you
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think Japan should contribute in the future to world peace and
the resolution of conflicts?" About 55 percent thought that
monetary and material aid were not enough and that Japan
should contribute some sort of "personnel aid" as well. It
should be noted though that 82 percent of those expressing the
need to send personnel to aid in conflicts qualified that to
mean personnel in strictly noncombat support roles. [Ref. 20:
pp. 280-281] The results of this poll were consistent with
others conducted on the same subject throughout the months the
months of the conflict. [Ref. 21: p. 6]
On the matter of financial support of the
multinational effort, public opinion was more divided. Polls
conducted in late January to early February 1991 by Tokyo
Shimbun, Nihon Kenzai Shimbun, and Asahi Shimbun indicated
that 51 to 53 percent of those polled expressed some type of
disapproval or "strong objection" with 36 to 39 percent
expressing approval of the contributions. [Ref. 18: p. 133]
The impact that public opinion had on the decision
process was significant. However, it is possible that the
public opinion perceived by the government and opposition
parties as the traditional hard line pacifist stance was
instead, a more mature, global view with more appreciation for
Japan's global role and responsibilities. The failure of the
UNPCB may not have been due to the desire of the Japanese to
guard themselves from all involvement in foreign conflicts. It
may have been more due to the failure on the part of the
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Government to recognize the true desires of the Japanese
people and to present a proposal reflecting these desires.
Few, if anyone, in the international community expect Japan,
at this point, to take part directly in foreign conflicts.
[Ref. 23: p. 19] The nation is simply not ready for that step.
However, the Japanese people appear to be willing to fill some




There appear to be in Japan several contradictory
forces that have created a paradoxical status quo in defense
policy. First, there is the generally pacifist public that
takes the peace constitution for granted "without really
considering what war and peace really are." [Ref. 17: p. 143]
Next is the passionately pacifist, liberal press who
continually fuel the fires of pacifism. Lastly there is a
government that has placed placation of U.S. demands and
preservation of friendly U . S . -Japanese relations ahead of all
or most other foreign policy concerns. The paradox rests in
the fact that despite the public's pacifist feelings, Asahi
Shiblum and government surveys show that the majority of
Japanese still fully sanction the Governments' s actions in
building the SDF forces into the world's third most costly
military force. The public, either out of ignorance or tacit
approval of government policy, have let the issue of defense
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and security take a back seat to other more pertinent issues
in the national policy debate. [Ref. 17 :p. 143]
Gulf War and its effect on Japan is significant in
several respects. First, the crisis forced into the open a
debate that places Japan at an important moment in its
history. The outcome from this debate will set the new pattern
for Japanese international cooperation. Second, it provided
new and revealing insights into the state of Japanese public
sentiment on defense and international responsibility.
Pacifism still reigns. But, a growing awareness of global
responsibility and equity is apparent. Third, it showed that
the Japanese style of governing works best when it is allowed
to function slowly and methodically as intended. Attempts to
force rapid policy change outside of normal procedures or time




Several questions directed the research efforts at the
start of this study. Returning to those questions we can, with
some new perspectives, shed some new light on the issues
initially raised.
1. Japan's Role
Our first questions sought to more fully understand
Japan' s role in the security scheme of the newly emerging
international order.
At this point, it appears that Japan's role in the
international security structure is not yet fully defined. The
recent events in Japan relating to the Persian Gulf Crisis
indicate that the debate goes on both in and out of Japan. But
within that debate there are several clear trends. First, the
Japanese government is committed to preserving U. S . -Japanese
relations and, thus, is willing to make great concessions to
American demands even at the expense of severe criticism and
political damage at home. Second, the pacifist ideal is still
the foundation of the public stance on defense, although there
are indications of a greater understanding of international
responsibility on the part of the Japanese public.
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2 . Internal Forces
The second set of questions attempted to analyze, to
the extent possible, the inner workings of the Japanese system
of policy making. This understanding is vital to all who have
to deal with the Japanese in official or unofficial
capacities. But, it is especially important that U.S. defense
negotiators and planners appreciate the intricacies of the
Japanese system due to the sensitivity of the issues involved
between the U.S. and Japan. There are several things that we
can expect from the Japanese system and many things that we
should not expect. This is important to understand to
establish realistic expectations and reliable predictions of
Japanese response to American requests.
a. What to Expect
First, we can expect stability. If anything
characterizes Japanese society and its government it is the
desire for stability. Although it may often appear divided,
stressed and at times even confused, there is, in Japan, a
common thread of concern for democratic and cultural ideals
which tend to bind the nation into a unified force.
We can expect a continuing desire on the part of
the Government and the public to preserve the long-standing
friendship and cooperation with the U.S. Most in Japan
recognize the importance of it. Many differences remain
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between the nations, but none represent a crisis as long as
communication remains amiable and positions remain flexible.
We can expect the pacifist tradition to endure and
be the guiding principle for Japanese foreign Policy for the
foreseeable future. It is important for Americans and others
in the international community to understand that the
pacifist ideal is a fact of life of Japan, woven into the
psyche of the nation. Whether the constitution is ultimately
revised or not, pacifism is the political reality of Japan. No
amount of bullying or "bashing" from other nations will change
that.
b. What Not to Expect
We should not expect to impose policy on the
Japanese solely to achieve U.S. objectives and U.S. views of
the proper objectives of the Japanese. Even though much of
U . S . -Japanese relations over the postwar period has been
characterized by such attempts, those days are coming to a
close as Japan's power grows.
In any attempt to affect Japanese defense policy we
should not expect quick results. Even if our strategy is
better thought-out and truly congruent with the goals of the




3 . U.S. Implications
The last questions posed in the introduction were
meant to define the implications of Japanese security policy
making on the U.S. and how best to handle Japanese relations
in general
.
First, it is important that Americans overcome the
pro-Japan and anti-Japan syndrome that defines very black-and-
white lines of cooperation and non-cooperation. We must learn
to deal with Japan effectively and flexibly in all areas of
policy, i.e., those areas where we enjoy a history of
cooperation and mutual help as well as those where there is
friction and competition. The key is to not let the
competition detract from and cloud the overall cooperativeness
of the entire relationship.
Clearly, key to this is the realization that
significant differences do exist between the U.S. and Japan
and to acceptance of these differences. Perhaps, neither
system is better in absolute terms. Each is adapted to a
society and a people that it serves and neither is likely to
change much in the near future. The challenge will be to
formulate a practical international security strategy of
response and request which fits within the framework of the
Japanese system and meets desires and needs of Japan as well
as the U.S. and the rest of the world.
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